

**GCAS 08/09 Supervised Project**

**New Zealand's Antarctic Bilateral Diplomacy**

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## Introduction

There is little attention paid to the international political linkages that New Zealand has forged through its connection to Antarctica. On the ground in Antarctica itself there is evidence abound that New Zealand is enjoying strong bilateral cooperation with a number of parties, from Malaysian scientists using Scott Base as a base of operations US air force planes have 'City of Christchurch' written on their side. However, virtually no research has been done into the nature of these relationships, how they were formed, their dynamics and the benefits and burdens they place upon New Zealand. This paper intends to provide some research into this area by using primary resources to paint a picture as to how New Zealand has created and maintained bilateral relationships regarding Antarctica. Those resources are old documents of the now disbanded Antarctic Division of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, sourced through Archives New Zealand.

The focus of the paper is on whether New Zealand was using its Antarctic connection improve upon its bilateral relationships with other states in other areas, for example, the using Antarctic cooperation as a carrot in negotiating a Free Trade Agreement. However, upon research, it soon became apparent the New Zealand was not using these connections in such a way, and also that these connections are little acknowledged. It appears that in practice, New Zealand's Antarctic aims, activities and relationships are kept separate from New Zealand's other international activities. It seems as if a foreign policy blind spot exists towards Antarctic and the Southern Ocean bilateral cooperation.

This paper shall explain this blind spot by using the organisational politics model first proposed by Graham T Allison, and also examine the role of at United States bureaucratic organisation that has a major influence in New Zealand's Antarctic policy: the National Science Foundation (NSF). As shall be explained, New Zealand is actually constrained in its ability to use its Antarctic connection as an incentive for relationships with other states due to the NSF being the dominant force in logistics in Christchurch. The

organisational politics model will also help explain why New Zealand is not using this cooperation to further its relationships.

The argument of this paper is that the disconnected nature of New Zealand's Antarctic operations and the focus on logistics, combined with the restricting capabilities of the NSF has in the past prevented New Zealand from using its Antarctic advantage to further bilateral relationships.

### **New Zealand's Antarctic Advantage**

A claimant state and a founding member of the Antarctic Treaty, New Zealand has been active in Antarctic politics since 1957, being a consultative state in the Antarctic Treaty System and maintains a year-round presence in the Ross Sea region.

New Zealand's Antarctic advantage arises out of its geographical proximity to the Ross Sea region. Few states are located far enough south to provide launching point for an Antarctic programme, and the Ross Sea region is a frequently used access point to reach the South Pole. The use of New Zealand as the final port before Antarctica dates back to the historic era of Antarctic exploration, with famous explorers such as Scott and Shackleton using Christchurch and the Port of Lyttleton as a launching pad.

The city of Christchurch having the International Antarctic Centre, acts and the logistical base for New Zealand's Ross Sea activities. Not only does the New Zealand programme operate out of Christchurch, but so does the United States which, uses Christchurch as a launching pad for flights to both McMurdo - their largest Antarctic base - and Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station as well as Lyttleton as a port for ships to McMurdo, and Italy, which operates in a similar manner.

These three states cooperate in Antarctic logistics by providing resources in a "pool". All three will provide flights which take personnel and cargo from all three Antarctic programmes.

Other launching pads for Antarctic activities include Argentina, Chile, Tasmania, South Africa and the Falklands Islands. The South American located ports have proximity to the Antarctic Peninsular.

In Antarctica, New Zealand has an advantage that other states cannot gain and New Zealand does reap economic benefit from this position.<sup>1</sup> The New Zealand's economy - and particularly Christchurch's - benefits from the link.<sup>2</sup> There is an economic benefits to be had therefore, from more Antarctic programmes operating out of Christchurch.

Many states that New Zealand has been building economic relationships with are also coincidentally interested in Antarctic research and are expanding their Antarctic programmes. India, for example, which is becoming an economic powerhouse, also has an expanding Antarctic programme.<sup>3</sup> China, which New Zealand has recently signed a free trade agreement with, also has been expanding its Antarctic presence.<sup>4</sup> Offering up use of Christchurch as an Antarctic launch pad could potentially be used to create closer relationships, increasing preferential treatment in creating Free Trade Agreements.

The New Zealand scientific community could also potentially benefit from cooperation. The facilities of other states could become of use, from Antarctic bases in other locations, to icebreakers to maybe even the use of Arctic research centres.

The potential benefits from using this connection are thus threefold. The connection can be used for economic benefit, it can be used to strengthen bilateral relationships prove beneficial for New Zealand and finally, there are scientific benefits to be had.

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<sup>1</sup> Stuart Prior 'Antarctica: View from a Gateway' (Centre for Strategic Studies Working Paper 5/97, 1997)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. Estimated to be \$40-\$50 million annually.

<sup>3</sup> Anne-Marie Brady, Elizabeth Holland, Sergey Tarasenko & Laura Taylor 'Emerging/Developing Country Investment in Antarctica' Unpublished Essay (University of Canterbury, Gateway Antarctica, 2009)

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

## Previous Literature

As mentioned earlier, there has been no exploration of the topic done before. There are a few works relating to the history of New Zealand's Antarctic politics. *A Wise Adventure* by Malcolm Templeton<sup>5</sup> discussed New Zealand's role in Antarctic politics between 1920 and 1960, but focuses on the multilateral cooperation rather than New Zealand's bilateral links and the research ends in 1960.

On the US-New Zealand relationship, *Antarctic Partners* by Neville Peat<sup>6</sup> gives a history from 1957 to 2007, but is a 'celebration' rather than an analysis of the relationship and does not provide any insights. Analysis of these bilateral connections is scarce.

## Organisational Politics

One explanation for the way that these bilateral relationships have developed and have remained separate from New Zealand's other interests could be that the organisational regimes of Antarctic decision making has had an influence.

Graham Allison in his book *The Essence of Decision* critiqued the traditional rational actor model of international relations discourse and presented in turn two other models for analysing decision making of states. In his organisational politics model, he drew from organisation theory and argued that instead of states being one unified body that thought with one mind, states are made up of a number of organisations and it is the output of these organisations is the foreign policy of states.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Malcolm Templeton, *A Wise Adventure* (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2000)

<sup>6</sup> Neville Peat, *Antarctic Partners* (Wellington: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2007)

<sup>7</sup> Graham T Allison, *The Essence of Decision*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971) 67

Following Allison's model, power is fractured.<sup>8</sup> One organisation has responsibility for one area, for example, diplomacy; another has responsibility for a different area, such as logistics. They are permitted to operate in those areas, and do not operate in the others.<sup>9</sup> From this fractured power structure, 'organizational parochialism' develops – a narrow view of what the organisation should concern itself with based on the area it operated, which influences how it believes it should operate and solve problems.<sup>10</sup>

Due to this narrow mindset, the behaviour of these organisations follows a set of pre-established routines.<sup>11</sup> These routines are influenced by the organisations goals (chief of which is its survival).<sup>12</sup> From these goals, certain behaviours result. Most notably, organisations tend to follow standard practices and compete for resources with other organisations.<sup>13</sup> The results of these actions can be moves by organisations that vary from leadership policy and clash with the actions of other organisations.<sup>14</sup>

Governmental leaders can influence the organisations, however, it is not always so that a leader can have much of an effect on the way the organisation conducts itself. If they do not make an effective and concerned effort to affect the way the organisation operates, the organisation will operate how it always has.<sup>15</sup>

Adding a further step onto this model, is that one of the organisations that has considerable say in New Zealand's Antarctic policy is the an organisation of another state: the National Science Foundation (NSF). The organisational forces at work in New Zealand regarding its Antarctic organisations would be at work in the US. In fact, Allison's model was created explaining decision making of large US governmental organisational structures. Therefore, it

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 80

<sup>9</sup> Ibid

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 81

<sup>11</sup> Ibid

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 82

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 93

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 89

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 86

would be artificial to assume that the NSF part of a homogenous entity known as the 'US government' after using the assumption that New Zealand's Antarctic policy is made by separate organisations. As such, it is the NSF's actions and not the US government's policy that this paper will concern itself with.

This means the same assumptions that are applied to the DSIR, Antarctica New Zealand and Antarctic Policy Division/Unit apply to the NSF. Of particular interest is the assumption relating to the lack of control by government leaders. While the US policy towards New Zealand during the time this essay is concerned with was unfavourable due to New Zealand's policy on nuclear ships, it does not necessarily follow that the NSF's policy was similarly unfavourable towards New Zealand. However, as shall be discussed later, there is some evidence that suggests that the NSF may have been punishing New Zealand for its controversial stance.

Finally, the model compliments the primary sources. What was available for this study were the documents of government organisation – the Antarctic Division of the DSIR - which were mostly communications between it and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and it and similar Antarctic institutions.

Allison's model has been heavily criticised by other scholars of foreign policy. One criticism that has particular relevance to the topic discussed in this paper is that Allison assumes that the goals of the organisations clash.<sup>16</sup> As shall be discussed later in this paper, it appears that New Zealand's Antarctic organisations are an example of when organisation's goals do not clash, for the most part.

The model further does not apply brilliantly to the case presented towards it. Allison being focused on the Cuban Missile Crisis poses the question of the creation of foreign policy as organisations responding to problems. Even the act of buying defensive missiles before the crisis is presented as addressing

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<sup>16</sup> Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H Hammond 'Rethinking Allison's Model' *The American Political Science Review* Vol.86 No.2 pp.301-322

the problem of the Cold War.<sup>17</sup> Whereas New Zealand's bilateral is the development of opportunities rather than addressing problems. It is not the fact the organisations responded badly, or in a manner inconsistent with the policy of the leadership, rather that they missed out on an opportunity to develop and benefit more from cooperative relationships.

## **Organisations**

There are a number of government organisations that have a hand in Antarctic diplomacy through state institution to states institution contact. Organisations come and go, but there always seems to be one organisation that deals with logistics, while another deals with matters of politics, law and policy.

### *Antarctica New Zealand*

Established in 1996 by the New Zealand Antarctic Institute Act 1996. One of the functions of Antarctica New Zealand is to 'co-operate with other institutions and organisations both within and outside New Zealand having objectives similar to those of New Zealand.'<sup>18</sup>

Located in Christchurch, Antarctica New Zealand is the major player today when it comes to logistical relationships. However, in the time frame that has been studied in this paper, it was not in existence. Matters of Antarctic logistics were covered by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR).

### *Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade*

The Ministry has had a few different names over the years, but has always been the same Wellington based entity throughout the time frame of this

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<sup>17</sup> Allison, above n.7, 67

<sup>18</sup> Antarctica New Zealand, *Statement of Intent 2008-2011* (Antarctica New Zealand, June 2008) 4



study. The division of the Ministry which deals with Antarctic matters is the Antarctic Policy Unit, previously known as the Antarctic Policy Division. The responsibilities of the Ministry in respect to Antarctica include dealing with the Antarctic Treaty System, giving advice to the government and ensuring compliance with international agreements that New Zealand is party to regarding Antarctica as well as 'Conducting New Zealand's relations with other countries in respect of Antarctica',<sup>19</sup>

The Antarctic Policy Unit is just one section of the Ministry. Other sections have their own mandate to deal with other issues, and it could be argued that Allison's model could apply within the Ministry itself. With each division concerned with its own mandate, parochialism could develop. This essay is concerned not with the other divisions, but with the Antarctic Policy Unit.

### *Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR)*

The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research is the organisation predating Antarctica New Zealand as the coordinator of New Zealand's Antarctic activities.

The DSIR was an organisation created in 1926 for the purpose of science. It ran New Zealand's Antarctic science programme during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-58,<sup>20</sup> with the Antarctic Division (NZAP) being set up in 1959 when it became apparent that New Zealand was going to maintain its presence in Antarctica.<sup>21</sup> DSIR was disestablished in 1992 and the Antarctic Division was transferred to the Ministry of External Relations and Trade.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Antarctica and New Zealand' <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/Antarctica/1-New-Zealand-and-Antarctica/index.php> (accessed 19 February 2009)

<sup>20</sup> Ross Galbreath, *DSIR: Making Science Work for New Zealand*, (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1998) 247

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, 256

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, 256

In the past, the Ministry and DSIR worked together coordinating Antarctic cooperative arrangements. However, there is evidence of some competition between the two organisations. With talks with Sweden, the Ministry was designated the contact point. The Antarctic Division protested this decision, stating that all communications would likely be regarding logistics and citing that all other agreements over Antarctic cooperation had previously been handled by the Division<sup>23</sup> and on occasion reminded the Swedish authorities that it was DSIR that handled matters of Antarctic policy.<sup>24</sup>

### *National Science Foundation (NSF)*

The National Science Foundation (NSF) was created in 1950 with the mission 'To promote the progress of science; to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare; to secure the national defence.'<sup>25</sup> The office that looks after its Antarctic concerns is the Office of Polar Programs (OPP).

### **Bilateral Relationships**

The documents available for research went up only to the year 1994. There is some information available about the bilateral relationships as they are today, from information on various state's Antarctic programmes and where they are operating from, to talking with those involved to observations that can be made.<sup>26</sup>

Being that this paper is an investigation into New Zealand's use of its Antarctic advantage to build relationships, the case studies chosen were Sweden and France. These two states have cooperation agreements with New Zealand that appear to be never used. The initial hypothesis was that these

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<sup>23</sup> R B Thomson, Letter to Wilson Bailey 'Re New Zealand Contact Under the Antarctic Cooperation Agreement with Sweden' December 1986 [Date obscured]

<sup>24</sup> J J W Bailey, Letter to Anders Karlqvist, 6 May 1985

<sup>25</sup> National Science Foundation *Investing in America's Future: Strategic Plan 2006-2011* (Washington: National Science Foundation, September 2006), 4

<sup>26</sup> For example: the author of this paper flew down to Antarctica on a South African owned and operated aircraft paid for by the Italian government as it's contribution to the logistical pool.

agreements were organised symbolic gestures for the purpose of creating closer relationships. This could not be further from the truth.

### *Sweden*

In the 1980s, there were moves for Sweden to operate its fledgling Antarctic programme through Christchurch and have joint Antarctic activities with New Zealand. Approaches were first made in 1985, through the Director of DSIR.<sup>27</sup> It appears that negotiations went very far into this becoming a reality. The Swedish government was enthusiastic about the opportunity. One message read: 'We are looking very closely at the Ross Sea area at the moment.'<sup>28</sup> Discussions between New Zealand and Sweden resulted in an agreement on Antarctic cooperation signed in 1986.<sup>29</sup>

However, the planned cooperation between New Zealand and Sweden never eventuated, the reason being the complicated relationship between New Zealand and the USA regarding Antarctic logistics. In 1987, it was made clear to the New Zealand authorities that the Americans were unwilling to use the resources in the logistics pool to provide for third parties who were not willing to contribute.

'Discussions I have had with Anders Karlquist both in Christchurch and San Diego were amicable and positive. The attitude and new politicise of Peter Wilkniss have however tempered these discussions to the extent of my not being in a position to even suggest let alone commit ourselves to assisting Sweden through our use of any U.S. resources. Wilkniss has states quite clearly that he will not provide New Zealand with resources for us to assist third parties'<sup>30</sup>

Furthermore, New Zealand began to have its doubts about working with Sweden.

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<sup>27</sup> R B Thomson, letter to C Beeby, 21 January 1985

<sup>28</sup> Message reprinted in R B Thomson, Letter to C Keating, 'Antarctica: Sweden/New Zealand' 19 November 1986. Emphasis as in the original document

<sup>29</sup> New Zealand and Sweden, 3 June 1986, *Exchange of Letters constituting and agreement concerning Antarctic cooperation*

<sup>30</sup> R B Thomson, Letter to Wilson Bailey, 2 March 1987

'The difficulties with the Swedes arise from their optimistic expectations of our joint relationship and the sensitivity of using United States logistic resources to support New Zealand-Swedish activities.'<sup>31</sup>

It appears that the negotiations fell apart.

One question that emerges from the saga of the Swedish cooperation was the role the NSF played in preventing the cooperation. The unwillingness of the rejection came at a time when the US-New Zealand relationship was particularly strained in the wake of the ANZUS row.

Further, the Swedish authorities noticed the way that New Zealand was being treated by the NSF, and they worried that it would hinder any plans to operate out of Christchurch. In a memorandum dated 13 October 1986, one official noted about the Swedes:

'Their main concern is the attitude of the Americans which Theutenberg described as "rude" and "explicitly negative." He thought this as partly to be explained by Peter Wilkness's personality and that national science foundation did not want third parties in McMurdo area. But at the end of our meeting he wondered aloud whether American attitude was reflection of the ANZUS problem. He implied that he did not want to see Swedish plans bogged down in a NZ/USA conflict.'<sup>32</sup>

It is quite possible that the ANZUS conflict was the reason that the NSF refused to allow third parties access to the logistical pool.

## ***France***

The possibility of the French Antarctic programme operating out of Christchurch began in 1992. A runway was being constructed at Dumont D'Urville station, and with flights being capable of landing, a launching pad was needed. Christchurch was in competition with Hobart, which while Hobart closer in proximity to the French station, Christchurch's infrastructure was

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<sup>31</sup> JJW Bailey, Letter to Colin Keating, 21 October 1986

<sup>32</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade internal memorandum 13 October 1986

superior.<sup>33</sup> To assist in cooperation, an agreement was drafted and signed, one which purposely reflected the Italian agreement.<sup>34</sup>

The relationship with France fell through when the runaway was damaged and later abandoned by the French programme. Acknowledgement was made that the agreement signed between France and New Zealand would be science based rather than logistical.<sup>35</sup>

It appears that the initial negotiation began with a representative of the French Antarctic programme approaching the head of the New Zealand Antarctic programme at the time, regarding the cooperation.<sup>36</sup> Again, as with the Swedes, it was the other government that took the initiative. In negotiations in Paris, the head of the NZAP. requested embassy officials to be present at the meeting in France,<sup>37</sup> so both organisations were connected with the effort at an early state.

In the end, the French agreement amounted to little due to bad fortune and an abandonment of the runway.

## **Other Relationships**

This paper will now briefly discuss New Zealand's cooperation relationship with Chile, Malaysia and South Korea. These three provide interest because a slightly different approach has been taken. New Zealand has relationships with a number of other states, such a logistical relationship with Italy and cooperation agreements with Germany and Switzerland,<sup>38</sup> all worthy of closer examination.

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<sup>33</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade internal memorandum 'NZ/France: Antarctica' 13 January 1994

<sup>34</sup> Stuart Prior, Letter to Keith Jordan, 14 September 1994

<sup>35</sup> Ibid

<sup>36</sup> D E Geddes, Letter to Christian Dors, 26 August 1992

<sup>37</sup> George Belloew, Facsimile to Stuart Prior, 23 December 1993

<sup>38</sup> Prior, above n.1

## **Chile**

New Zealand has a bilateral treaty of Antarctic cooperation with Chile. Chile appears to be the one example in which it was proposed that New Zealand could benefit in areas such as trade from closer Antarctic cooperation with Chile. About the formation of the agreement it was written: 'Chile is an increasingly important trading partner of New Zealand and our relationships with it are developing in a number of areas.'<sup>39</sup> However, it was Chile that approached New Zealand for an agreement of Antarctic cooperation.<sup>40</sup>

## **Malaysia**

Currently, New Zealand provides logistical support for Malaysian scientists working in the Ross Sea region. This cooperation dates back to 1999.<sup>41</sup> When the author was at Scott Base in December 2008, Malaysian scientific equipment was being stored in the Hillary Field centre, awaiting use. The details of the cooperation are unknown, but it does appear that third party logistics are taking place now. Further research is required to know the implications of this in regard to the example of Sweden.

## **South Korea**

Interest in South Korea as an Antarctic logistical partner dates back to 1992.<sup>42</sup> Currently, there are talks of Christchurch being a launching point for South Korea's Antarctic programme, which is timely given that there are moves being made towards a free trade agreement with South Korea. In November 2007 a joint feasibility study was completed<sup>43</sup> and submissions are now

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<sup>39</sup> Stuart Prior, Letter to the Director of the New Zealand Antarctic Programme, 20 August 1993

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

<sup>41</sup> Brady et al, above n.3

<sup>42</sup> S W Prior, Letter to the Ambassador of the New Zealand Embassy in Seoul, 14 December 1992

<sup>43</sup> Helen Clark and Roh Moo-Hyun, *A Partnership for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 8 December 2006, available at <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/foreign-relations/northasia/21centurypartnership.pdf>

open.<sup>44</sup> However, these negotiations are not linked.<sup>45</sup> There could be benefits in linking the talks. For example, the FTA negotiations may be more set in stone than the logistical arrangement, and tying the logistical arrangement to the FTA could ensure the logistics negotiations do not fall through.

## **The United States**

The United State bilateral relationship provides crucial support for New Zealand's own Antarctic programme. The cooperation began in 1957. Logistical cooperation is crucial for New Zealand's Antarctic programme, from the provision of flights to the sharing of resources on Ross Island. In 1985, when US-New Zealand relationship was at a low point, in a letter from the DSIR to the Ministry, it was urged (in capitals and red ink) that New Zealand's Antarctic activity could not continue without the logistical support of the United States.<sup>46</sup> This gives the NSF an enormous amount of power in the relationship.

Due to the timing of the collapse of the Swedish cooperation negotiations, the question has to be asked: was the denial of Antarctic logistics to third parties New Zealand want to get into cooperation in punishment New Zealand's stance on nuclear powered ships?

The answer to the question is unclear. It is clear that the ANZUS row was on the minds of those involved in Antarctica at the time. There was call from some official voices in the United States for America to move its logistical base to Hobart or the Falkland Islands.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 'Call for Submissions on the potential for a New Zealand- Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement' January 2009  
<http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-Relationships/Call-for-public-submissions/index.php#trade-relations> (Accessed 17 February 2009)

<sup>45</sup> Trevor Hughes, 'RE: Questions from a GCAS student for a supervised project' Email, 16 February 2009

<sup>46</sup> R B Thomson, Letter to Wilson Bailey, 18 March 1985

<sup>47</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs internal memorandum regarding US Secretary of the Navy's visit, 5 November 1986

However, it appears the director of the NSF at the time did not want to bring the ANZUS row into Antarctic cooperation, or at least the director of STAR laboratories wrote to the director of DSIR at the time of the appointment.<sup>48</sup> Of course, it may have been that the Swedish were unwilling to contribute to the logistical pool. Information is not available regarding the exact details of the negotiations. Further more, while Wilkness, a later director, was described as difficult, reports were that he was trying to keep ANZUS politics out of Antarctic cooperation.<sup>49</sup> Given the information, there can be no definitive conclusion drawn about the role of the ANZUS row in the failed Swedish agreement.

## Discussion

The questions that arise are: given the potential benefit and the interest that has been expressed in the past from some states, why does New Zealand not have more Antarctic connections? And why does it not link them more closely in with its other goals? The answer to the first question is a matter of capability that can be explained by the role of the NSF. The answer to the latter a lack of attention that can be explained using the organisational politics model.

One of the most interesting points that came out of the research is the fact that New Zealand's ability to build bilateral Antarctic cooperation relationships in the past has been dependant on United States cooperation, in particular, the NSF. It is unclear whether the Swedish example was an anomaly, but the example does illustrate that the logistical arrangement gives the NSF considerable power, and may have prevented New Zealand cooperating with the Swedish Antarctic Programme.

Furthermore, the fact that New Zealand cannot – or at least could not in the mid-1980s – maintain its Antarctic presence without the logistical support of the United States has potential legal ramifications regarding its claim to the

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<sup>48</sup> Antony C Fraser-Smith, Letter to Robert Thomson, 16 December 1985

<sup>49</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Internal Memorandum from Washington to Wellington, 10 July 1986



continent. Perfection of the claim requires effective occupation, and it appears that without the NSF, New Zealand cannot effectively occupy even Scott Base.

Finally, it appears that misfortune also occasionally played a hand, as illustrated by the French runway. The lack of the ability to use of Christchurch as a base causes New Zealand to lose out on the economic benefits that could be had.

The next question that arises is why New Zealand does not use its Antarctic ties to strengthen relationships. Why, for example, is New Zealand not approaching India with offers of using Christchurch, in a effort to create friendly ties in the hope of a creating a free trade agreement? Why are the FTA talks with South Korea remaining separate?

It is Allison's governmental organisations model that can explain the lack of attention. The DSIR - and this may extend to Antarctica New Zealand today - was not concerned with strengthening New Zealand's bilateral ties with other states in areas such as trade. Its mandate and concern is with New Zealand's Antarctic logistics and science and forays into bilateral politics are to do with logistics and science, and little else. Considering a logistical arrangement in the wider context of the relationship with that particular state, for example, trade, it outside of the scope of its operation. The same goes for the Antarctic Policy Unit, which seems to focus on the bilateral relationship in terms of Antarctic logistics again, and little else. It appears the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is suffering a degree of 'organisational parochialism' within itself.

However, Allison's model does not match perfectly. The goals of the organisations are in conflict, as Allison's model assumes.<sup>50</sup> These organisations also are not in competition, as Allison's model implies. It is that

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<sup>50</sup> Thomson and Hammond, above n.16, 302

it seems organisations are unaware that these bilateral ties could be used to improve upon relationships and potential bring benefit to New Zealand.

It seems the earlier parts of the model were more useful than later.

Organisational parochialism is useful in explaining the blind spot. However, the rest of Allison's model does not assist in the understanding of New Zealand's Antarctic politics at all. The idea of competing organisations does not fit, and standards of practice apply only tentatively.

While this essay has focused on the New Zealand institutions in regards to the major case studies of Sweden and France with no exploration of the institutions that the New Zealand organisations were dealing with. When negotiating cooperation agreements, the New Zealand organisations were dealing with their logistical counterparts overseas. There may have been no opportunity to go further. Allison writes that international counterparts can entrench parochialism being that they all have similar mandates and do not look beyond them<sup>51</sup> and this may be the case in the circumstances.

In the end, the blind spot towards Antarctica caused by the 'organisational parochialism' explains why New Zealand is losing out on strengthening relationships.

## **Conclusion**

There are two reasons why New Zealand does not use its Antarctic bilateral connections to improve upon relationships. The first can be explained by the model that this paper has worked with: governmental politics. While some of the Allison's model is unhelpful, the idea of 'organisational parochialism' is a useful tool for understanding the blind spot towards Antarctica.

The second reason emerged on researching the Swedish cooperation agreement. The NSF has a huge amount of influence in logistical

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<sup>51</sup> Allison, above n.7, 81

arrangements. New Zealand cannot make promises on Antarctic logistics, because at the end of the day, the NSF has a huge amount of power to decline should they not wish to provide the logistics.

The area of bilateral cooperation between New Zealand and other states has been barely explored. Even the most noticeable relationship with the US has generated little research. This paper is just scratching the surface of the subject area. Future areas for research include a more detailed exploration of New Zealand's Antarctic connection with the NSF and the relationship with Italy, a smaller party that operates out of Christchurch.

Finally, the question has to be asked, *should* New Zealand use its Antarctic advantage to improve upon bilateral relationships? Would this politicise the Antarctic cooperation to the point where it becomes unmanageable? It may be that New Zealand and/or Antarctica benefits more from the status quo.

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